INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor,' striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 2 was remarkable in many ways. 3 Yet it was also simply the latest example of the Court's decades-long trend of ignoring suspect class analysis in equal protection cases. The Court now has struck down two laws as violating the equal protection rights of gays and lesbians without even broaching the question whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect class. 4 This avoidance of the suspect class issue is not an idiosyncratic feature of sexual orientation cases; the Court has not performed a serious suspect class analysis -or purported to -in nearly thirty years. To put that point in more personal terms, no current Justice was sitting the last time the Court purported to engage in such an analysis. Thus, the current generation of the Court has not seriously engaged the political process theory that guided much of the Court's equal protection thinking during the Burger Court.
5
In its place, the Court has employed analytical approaches that attempt to cut through the mediating principles that constitute suspect class analysis. 6 Two examples are particularly notable. First, in its modem race jurisprudence, the Court has embraced a presumption that the Constitution requires color blindness, basing this conclusion on a combination of moral imperative and the Court's perception of the core meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to race. 7 Second, in its famous series of "rational basis plus" cases, it has attempted to discern when discrimination is motivated by illegitimate animus. 8 These disparate approaches share a concern with applying core equal protection law (as the Court understands that law) rather than deciding cases based on a decisional heuristic, such as political process theory, that attempts to approximate the results a court would reach if it were able accurately to discern and apply equal protection's core meaning. 9 Windsor is simply the most recent -and perhaps most extreme' 0 -example of this more direct approach to equal protection. The Court's approach holds both perils and promise for equal protection doctrine generally. But for current purposes, the importance of the Court's approach lies in its implications for congressional power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause -the so-called "enforcement power" or "Section 5 power."'" Judicial doctrine insists that enforcement legislation be "congruent and proportional" to the constitutional violation Congress seeks to remedy.' 2 In stark contrast to its underlying equal protection jurisprudence, the Court's Enforcement Clause jurisprudence has, at least until very recently, relied heavily on a group's suspect class status when determining whether enforcement legislation benefitting that group satisfies the congruence and proportionality test. The doctrinal template was straightforward: If the benefitted group was a suspect or quasi-suspect class, "it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations" justifying enforcement legislation.' 3 If it was not, then Congress's task was more difficult: It would have to "identify, not just the existence of [discriminatory] state decisions, but a 'widespread pattern' of irrational reliance on such [nonsuspect] criteria. ' 
14
I See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court has reached its presumptive rule requiring colorblindness). 8 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ct'., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that mental retardation is not a suspect classification but nevertheless striking down the city's zoning decision on the ground that it reflected unconstitutional animus against the mentally retarded).
9 See infra notes 178-79 (explaining the idea of a constitutional heuristic and applying that concept to equal protection review).
10 See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (explaining why Windsor potentially reflects an unusually explicit version of this approach to equal protection law).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). 12 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (announcing the "congruence and proportionality" standard).
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Recently this template has deteriorated. In 2012 the Court held that a provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 15 exceeded Congress's enforcement power, even though the FMLA was enacted to combat sex discrimination, a phenomenon that triggers heightened equal protection scrutiny.' 6 In 2013 the Court struck down the coverage formula for the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 17 which protects against race discrimination in voting.
1 8 These decisions depart from the template described in the previous paragraph in that the Court in these cases struck down enforcement legislation as exceeding Congress's power even though the targeted discrimination -respectively, based on sex and racetriggered heightened judicial scrutiny. 19
Thus, the Court's enforcement power doctrine has entered a potentially transitional stage. The decision in Windsor confirms that future equal protection decisions considering equality claims by emerging 2 0 groups will likely turn less on application of suspect class doctrine and more on the Court's holistic, if ad hoc and particularized, estimations of the rationality and publicpurpose basis for a challenged law. 21 At the same time, the Court's (2013) . The relevance of Shelby County is very slightly more attenuated than that of the other cases discussed in this Article because of its ambiguous doctrinal foundation. The Court suggested that the constitutionality of the coverage formula presented questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, see id. at 2622 n.1, although its analysis focused on the Fifteenth Amendment, see id. at 2619-29 (referring to the Fifteenth Amendment). More relevant for our purposes, the Court was also notably vague in its statement of the standard by which it reached its decision to reject the coverage formula. See id at 2622 n.1 (referring to a prior case, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193 (2009) , as setting the applicable standard of review); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204 (declining to decide whether the VRA was properly reviewed under the congruence and proportionality standard).
19 Indeed, in the case of the VRA, the right at issue -voting -is also one that enjoys heightened protection as a matter of the "fundamental rights strand" of equal protection. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (stating that the right to vote is a "fundamental political right" (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) . 20 "Emerging" groups in this context means simply groups whose suspect-class status has not yet been determined by the Court. In most cases, this characteristic traces back to the fact that the group was not sufficiently visible or organized to mount colorable equal protection claims during the period when the Court employed suspect class analysis more regularly. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (acknowledging that as of 1985 the suspect classification status of sexual orientation had not yet been determined by the Court). 21 Of course, lower courts may feel themselves more constrained to apply standard suspect class doctrine. Indeed, one recent post-Windsor case relied on that decision to BOSTON UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW Enforcement Clause doctrine, which until 2012 was tied closely to suspectclass analysis, is possibly entering a state of flux.
The uncertainty caused by the combination of these developments likely will come to a head soon. At some point in the not-too-distant future, Congress will likely enact the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), 22 a law that would ban workplace discrimination (including by state employers) on the basis of sexual orientation and perhaps gender identity. Although not currently on the legislative agenda, expansion of federal public accommodations laws to include sexual orientation is also a possibility. 23 Beyond sexual orientation and transgender identity, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 24 which is already law, restricts discrimination on the basis of one's genetic makeup. Congress has also expanded the Americans with Disabilities Act in a way that potentially protects at least some obese persons. 25 While all these laws either are or would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause, 26 plaintiffs' ability to obtain retrospective relief against state governments violating these laws rests largely on those laws being upheld as enforcement legislation. 27 But their bona fides as enforcement legislation is conclude that sexual orientation discrimination requires heightened judicial scrutiny. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) ("In its words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation that is unquestionably higher than rational basis review. In other words, Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual orientation.").
22 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013) . 23 Other possibilities for federal legislation include guidelines for antibullying programs in schools (which might include sexual orientation as a protected class) and federal protection for gay and lesbian adoption and parentage rights. Unlike the legislation mentioned in the text, these types of laws would presumably have to rest either on Congress's spending power or its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, given limits on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (suggesting strongly that federal regulation of family law and education matters would not come within Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause). The spending power may also be an unsure foundation for such legislation. 35 That Section reveals the close connection the Court has drawn between Congress's enforcement power and the Court's own equal protection doctrine, most notably its suspect class jurisprudence. Part L.A concludes, however, with a discussion of recent cases suggesting an erosion of that close connection. Part I.B next describes the breakdown of the Court's suspect class jurisprudence. That description culminates with Windsor. Part I.B explains how Windsor potentially makes a conclusive break with suspect class analysis in favor a more direct, but particularized, pointillist 36 constitutional methodology. Part II considers the implications of these developments. It begins by observing that legislative developments are hastening the arrival of a moment of truth for the enforcement power. 37 With GINA and potential obesity protections enacted, and ENDA -perhaps with a gender identity componentunder serious consideration, the United States Code may soon feature laws based on the Enforcement Clause that protect several groups whose suspect class status is unknown and may never be determined conclusively. Part II then considers the problem such legislation poses for the Court's current combination of equal protection and enforcement power jurisprudence. 38 It explains that courts will find it difficult to apply the congruence and proportionality test's fundamental requirement -that courts measure the relationship between enforcement legislation and the targeted constitutional right -when that right has been identified in the narrow, particularistic way reflected in Windsor. To the extent Windsor heralds a new approach to equal protection issues, this difficulty will become widespread. Part III offers a way forward. It suggests that Windsor reflects the Court's attempt to read the social meaning of legislation, and to test that meaning against equal protection's core requirement that government act only in pursuit of a public purpose. This judicial willingness to read social meaning into legislation suggests that the Court should respect Congress's performance of that same function when enacting enforcement legislation. Indeed, such judicial respect is especially appropriate in light of Congress's superior capability and legitimacy to perform that task. 39 " Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court was joined in relevant part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas (all three of whom were members of the fivejustice bloc that reshaped the Court's federalism jurisprudence in the 1990s), as well as by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (both of whom were consistent opponents of the majority's federalism agenda). Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Justice Breyer, agreed with the Court's enforcement power analysis, even though they were on opposite sides of the other major federalism cases of the era. They dissented in Boerne solely because they disagreed with the scope of the underlying right the enforcement legislation sought to promote. Justice Souter did not reach the enforcement power question. Thus, no Justice expressly disagreed with the majority's congruence and proportionality analysis, seven agreed with it fully, an eighth agreed with it partially, and one expressed no opinion. 51 The Court drew a tight connection between the proportionality prong of the congruence and proportionality test and the equal protection status of age discrimination. After reviewing the Court's age discrimination jurisprudence, the Court concluded:
Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." The Act, through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.
52
The Court then rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the ADEA's limitations and exceptions restricted the statute's reach to the point that it prohibited only the arbitrary age discrimination that would fail rational basis review if challenged under the Equal Protection Clause itself. 53 Throughout this analysis, then, the focus remained on the relationship between the statute's scope and the Court's rule that age discrimination violated the Constitution only if it failed rational basis review. 51 See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (reviewing the general understanding that the Court had previously applied a stricter than usual rational basis test to legislation discriminating on the basis of mental retardation).
59 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing the legislative record documenting discrimination against persons with disabilities, which included thirteen congressional hearings and task force hearings in every state).
60 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 61 Id. at 442-47. 62 Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court's heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling given that Cleburne's ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny."). 63 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1363, 1400 (2011) (describing Cleburne as applying "muscular" rational basis review).
64 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 n.4 ("Applying the basic principles of rationality review, The Court's resolution of the level of scrutiny problem paved the way for its consideration of the implications of Congress's lengthy record of discrimination against disabled workers. The Court reviewed that record exceptionally strictly, in a way that reduced most of Congress's examples to irrelevance. 65 Taken together, the Court's review amounted to an insistence that the only relevant instances of discrimination were those committed by a state (rather than private entities or even subunits of state government), 66 which, if challenged in court, would fail rational basis scrutiny. 67 Given these criteria -in particular, the requirement that any relevant example reflect not just irrational discrimination, but discrimination so irrational as to fail the Court's own rational basis standard, complete with that standard's progovernment presumptions 68 -it was unsurprising that the Court concluded that Congress had failed to identify a pattern of relevant conduct justifying the ADA's employment provisions as enforcement legislation. 69 Thus, as with Kimel, the Garrett Court's analysis ultimately turned heavily on the suspect class status of the benefitted group. Indeed, Garrett's insistence on reviewing enforcement legislation according to the judicially created suspect class template was so pronounced that prominent scholars began referring to the Court's Enforcement Clause doctrine as "juricentric. ''70 Cleburne struck down the city ordinance in question.").
65 Id. at 369-72 (discounting congressional findings of discrimination against the disabled because most of these findings only implicated private employers, and the findings of state discrimination were only "unexamined, anecdotal accounts").
66 Id. at 369 (criticizing the congressional record supporting the ADA for its dearth of "incidents" that "deal with activities of States"); id. at 368-69 (refusing to consider examples of discrimination from sub-units of state governments).
67 Id. at 372 (holding that "even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples [of discrimination against people with disabilities] a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States," the ADA would fail because "it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities" instead of new facilities that accommodate disabled employees). 68 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (setting forth the evidentiary presumptions in favor of government action that is challenged as failing the rational basis standard).
69 As in Kimel, the Garrett Court then considered whether the statute's scope sufficiently cabined state liability for the law to be considered congruent and proportional to the underlying constitutional violation. 531 U.S. at 372-74. Also as in Kimel, the Court found the statute to be not sufficiently cabined. Id. Court upheld provisions of the FMLA allowing workers time off for the care of ill family members. 72 The State defended the provisions as legislation enforcing the equal protection right to sex equality. 73 The Court agreed, employing a markedly more lenient congruence and proportionality review than that in either Kimel or Garrett. For example, the Court relied upon private-sector data, 74 accepted disparate impact results rather than insisting on only results flowing from discriminatory intent, 75 and rejected the argument that FMLA leave was unnecessary in light of state governments' decisions to grant such leave as a matter of state law. 76 In a key passage, the Court harmonized this more lenient review with its more stringent review in Kimel and Garrett in a way that explicitly linked the fate of enforcement legislation to the suspect class status of the benefitted group. The following passage can be understood as summing up the first phase of the Court's application of the congruence and proportionality standard to equal protection enforcement legislation:
[T]he States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation. We reached the opposite conclusion in Garrett and Kimel. In those cases, the § 5 legislation under review responded to a purported tendency of state officials to make age-or disability-based distinctions. Under our equal protection case law, discrimination on the basis of such characteristics is not judged under a heightened review standard, and passes muster if there is a rational basis for doing so .... Here, however, Congress directed its attention to state gender discrimination, which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based 1134-35 (2005) . 71 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
72 Id. at 740 (concluding that the FMLA provision is "congruent and proportional to its remedial object, and can 'be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior').
73 Id. at 730-32. 74 Id. at 730. 75 Id. at 749-50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for relying on evidence that "could perhaps support the charge of disparate impact, but not a charge that States have engaged in a pattern of intentional discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment"). different set of FMLA provisions, providing leave time for an employee to attend to his own illnesses. 79 Like the statute's family-care provisions, the FMLA's self-care provisions were defended as legislation enforcing the equal protection right to sex equality. 80 Defenders argued that that the self-care provisions helped mitigate the sex-skewed impact of the FMLA's family-care provisions. 81 They suggested that employers would likely view those latter provisions as a benefit primarily utilized by women, who employers presume to be primarily responsible for caring for ill family members. 82 This dynamic, they suggested, would redound to women's detriment, as the FMLA would ultimately be seen as making women less attractive as employees. The defenders thus argued that the self-care provisions mitigated that effect by providing a benefit that employees would use on a sex-neutral basis.
83
As legislation targeting sex discrimination, under the existing template the self-care provisions would receive relatively lenient review. But they did not.
Breaking with that template, the plurality 84 expressed skepticism about the value of the self-care provisions in mitigating any sex-skewed impact flowing from the FMLA's family-care provisions. 85 Indeed, the plurality even cited the availability of self-care leave under state law as evidence of the lack of a constitutional problem, thus arguably contradicting Hibbs's dismissal of similar state provision of family-care leave. 86 Given this relatively stringent review, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Coleman plurality never quoted Hibbs's language about the easier evidentiary task Congress faced when enacting enforcement legislation benefitting a group the Court had identified as a suspect class. It is possible to read Coleman as consistent with the Kimel-Garrett-Hibbs template. As explained above, in Coleman the plurality simply did not believe that the self-care provisions achieved any significant improvement in sex equality. 8 7 It is possible, perhaps, that Coleman has introduced a new, preliminary, requirement that enforcement legislation be minimally effective before it will be tested for congruence and proportionality. Under this reading, before legislation like the self-care provisions can be tested under Hibbs's more generous approach to judging congruence and proportionality, a court has to be convinced that the legislation actually furthers the sex equality goal. To be sure, Coleman did not explicitly impose such a hurdle. Nevertheless, such a reading renders Coleman more consistent with earlier cases that did not mention such a requirement, perhaps because the earlier statutes (the ADEA, the ADA, and the FMLA's family-care provisions) clearly advanced the prophylactic enforcement legislation except in the context of race discrimination, see Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
85 Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334-38.
86
The two situations may not be precisely alike. In Hibbs the majority acknowledged that some states had provided family leave, but then went on to critique the comprehensiveness of those benefits. See Hibbs v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 538 U.S. 721, 733-34 (2003) (reviewing the "shortcomings of some state policies," including state measures that provide childcare leave only for women, thereby "reinforc[ing] the very stereotypes that Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA"). Nevertheless, Hibbs's first, and presumably primary, answer to the argument that state-granted family leave rendered enforcement legislation on that topic unnecessary focused on the fact that states did not begin considering such leave until federal leave legislation was introduced. See id. at 732-33. Taking this response seriously would suggest that Coleman also should have engaged the chronology question when determining the significance of states' provision of self-care leave. It did not. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334-35. 87 See, e.g., Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335-37 (rejecting the argument that the self care provision furthered sex equality by serving as a necessary adjunct to the family care provisions upheld in Hibbs); id. at 1335 ("Without widespread evidence of sex discrimination or sex stereotyping in the administration of sick leave, it is apparent that the congressional purpose in enacting the self care provision is unrelated to these supposed wrongs."). But see id. at 1337-38 (acknowledging that most single parents are women, and thus suggesting that the self-care provision may remedy employers' leave restrictions that have a disparate impact on women). asserted goals, leaving as the only question whether they were too aggressivethat is, not congruent and proportional -in achieving them. 88 Still, at least in the absence of an explicit Court statement to this effect, an equally plausible reading is that Coleman does mark some type of break with the Kimel-GarrettHibbs template.
That template has continued to erode. In 2013, the year after Coleman, the Court struck down the formula by which states were made subject to the preclearance provisions of the VRA. 89 The VRA was designed to protect the voting rights of racial minorities, thus combining protections based on race with the right to vote, which is one of the few rights subject to a presumptive constitutional requirement of equal distribution. 9 " Thus, one would expect judicial review of the VRA to be quite deferential. The Court in Shelby County v. Holder, however, second guessed the preclearance provision's coverage formula, concluding that Congress's failure to update that formula for several decades rendered it irrational in light of improvements in minority voting statistics in the covered jurisdictions. 9 ' Nevertheless, the impact of Shelby County on the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is unclear. Most notably, the Court's statement of the relevant standard of review is quite opaque. The VRA was enacted and defended as legislation enforcing both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments. 92 In particular, the Court originally upheld the preclearance provisions at issue in Shelby County as legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. 93 The Court has never held that Boerne's congruence and proportionality standard applies to legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. In Shelby County, the Court's discussion of its standard of review simply cited as controlling its earlier VRA case, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, where the Court was presented with, but avoided, the enforcement power question. 94 Northwest Austin, however, 88 To state this requirement is not, of course, to express agreement either with it or how it is applied. Cf id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's analysis of the self care provision). reflected the white majority's decision to burden itself for the benefit of a minority group. 0 1 Yet the Court began its discussion of the scrutiny level, not with political process analysis, but rather with a discussion of the substantive evils of government race consciousness. 1 02 When it did get to the political process argument -an argument the Court's phraseology suggested stood in logical tension with the Court's earlier identification of those harms 1 0 3 -the Court provided a formalistic, halfhearted, and unconvincing application of political process reasoning to justify heightened scrutiny of the particular plan at issue in JA. Croson. 1 0 4 To be sure, the Court continues to apply heightened scrutiny in race cases, and appears to take seriously the question of the scrutiny level. Indeed, two days before deciding Windsor, the Court vacated an appellate court decision reviewing a university's race-based affirmative action plan, on the ground that the lower court had misapplied the strict scrutiny standard. 05 The Court, however, reaffirmed its commitment to a substantive, rather than a process-based understanding as to why racial classifications merited such heightened review. , at *9-21 (using political process reasoning to argue for a less-than-strict level of judicial review of affirmative action plans designed to assist politically powerless minorities); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 735 (1974) ("When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent standard of review, are lacking.").
102 J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."). 103 See id. at 495 ("Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances of this case." (emphasis added)). 104 See id. at 495-96 (observing that blacks occupied five of the nine seats on the Richmond City Council when the set-aside plan was adopted).
10 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) . 116 See id. at 2418 (describing race classifications as "odious to a free people," "contrary to our traditions," and "seldom ... a relevant basis for disparate treatment" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 308-09 (1991) ("For the first time the Justices have been forced to choose between a political process theory, which identifies suspect classifications according to criteria of historical discrimination and political impotence, and a more openly normative theory of 'relevance,' which banishes certain criteria from governmental decisionmaking on the ground that they should be irrelevant. . [Vol. 94:367
Four years after JA. Croson, the Court had an opportunity to revisit Cleburne's suspect class analysis. In Heller v. Doe, 1 0 7 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to a state's procedure for civil confinement of the mentally ill.
1°8 Justice Kennedy, on behalf of the Court, upheld the state procedures as satisfying the rational basis standard. 1 0 9 Justice Kennedy observed the plaintiffs' argument in favor of applying heightened scrutiny, but refused to address it, on the ground that it had not been raised in the lower courts. 110 In deciding to apply the rational basis standard, Justice Kennedy cited Cleburne as an example of the Court having applied that level of scrutiny to mental retardation classifications. 11 ' In a manner previewing its analysis in Garrett,' 1 2 however, the Heller majority implied that Cleburne-style rationality review did not differ from the traditional, highly deferential scrutiny normally associated with the rational basis standard. 113 In other words, when presented with an opportunity to address whether Cleburne had enshrined a de facto heightened-scrutiny standard, and the level of scrutiny issue more generally, the Court demurred on both questions. 116 Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at *51 ("Respondents here seek to perpetuate a sex-based exclusion that dates from a time when women could neither vote nor 'hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children."' (citation omitted)), with Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 115, at *11 (acknowledging the argument based on this history of discrimination against women, but arguing against an increase in the scrutiny level accorded sex classifications).
117 Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at *50 ("[S]ex, like race, is an immutable and highly visible characteristic .... ), with Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 115, at * 14 ("Despite the fact that mental retardation is an immutable characteristic, beyond the individual's control ... the Court [in Cleburne] would not upgrade the level of scrutiny applied to this type of legislative classification.").
118 Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at *52 ("Despite the fact that women are a numerical majority in the United States, women remain vastly politically underrepresented in state and federal government-The relative political powerlessness also demonstrates the need for searching judicial analysis when government treats men and women differently."), with Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 115, at * 18 ("Women already have the political power to elect women to represent them; indeed if all women voted the same and chose to elect only women, virtually every elected office in the United States could be filled by a woman."), and id. at *19-21 (providing statistics suggesting women's equality in the marketplace).
119 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Carolene Products and suggesting that application of standard suspect class criteria would result in sex classifications receiving only rational basis review (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
120 See id at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history. As a plurality of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, 'our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination."' (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973))).
[Vol. Justice O'Connor's recognition that rational basis review can occur in a more heightened register provided part of the backdrop of doctrinal options the Court faced in its final gay rights decision to date, Windsor. 130 The majority in Windsor had before it the precedent of a concurring (although not decisive) The Reed Court concluded that the state law, which instituted a preference for male over female relatives as estate administrators, failed traditional rational basis review. 1 33 That conclusion was perhaps unconvincing; the Idaho law may have been unfair, but given the likely educational differences between men and women in that era the classification cannot be deemed so irrational as to fail traditional rational basis review. 140 While recognizing that Congress has occasionally enacted "discrete" 1 41 statutes prescribing who could take advantage of the status of "married" for particular federal purposes, he cautioned that section 3's broad applicability to over 1000 federal rights and responsibilities accessible to married persons raised the possibility that section 3 was aimed simply at "demeaning" persons in same-sex relationships.
1 42 Upon investigating section 3's text and legislative materials, Justice Kennedy concluded that section 3 had precisely this invidious motivation and was thus unconstitutional. 143 Notably, he reached this conclusion without considering whether sexual orientation constituted a suspect basis for classification and without even identifying a standard of review. Indeed, he reached this result without examining whether the statute had even a rational connection to a legitimate govemment interest.
Much of this analysis echoes Justice Kennedy's earlier decision in Romermost notably his avoidance of the suspect class question and his focus on the challenged legislation's broad impact. 144 Yet in important ways, Windsor goes even further than Romer in abandoning traditional equal protection review. As observed above, unlike in Romer, Justice Kennedy in Windsor did not even perform the standard task of testing the statute for a rational connection to the proffered legitimate govemment interests.
1 45 Instead, to a degree much more direct than even in Romer, in Windsor he cut to the core of the equal protection guarantee, finding direct evidence of animus in DOMA's legislative materials.1 140 Id. at 2692. 141 See id at 2690 ("Though these discrete examples establish the constitutionality of limited federal laws that regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy, DOMA has far greater reach .... ). 142 See id. at 2694 ("This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects .... "). 141 See id. at 2695 ("[The investigation of these factors] requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution."). 144 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995) (discussing the implications of the breadth of Colorado's Amendment 2).
141 Id. at 635 (testing Amendment 2's fit against the rationales proffered by the state government of Colorado). But see Young & Blondel, supra note 3, at 137-42 (suggesting that the Court at least implicitly took some account of at least some justifications for section 3 in Windsor).
146 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 ("The history of DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages . . . was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.").
[Vol. 94:367 apply suspect class analysis -or even to acknowledge the possibility that sexual orientation could be a suspect class. 147 That avoidance also shattered the Reed-Frontiero template, in which an early case decided on minimalist rational basis grounds ultimately provided support for a broader decision granting that group heightened scrutiny. 148 Second, Windsor's confident conclusion 149 that section 3 reflected nothing but animus suggests an alternative approach to equal protection, one that abjures reliance on the indirect mediating principles implicit in suspect-class analysis (and even in traditional "fit" analysis) in favor of a more direct examination of a challenged law's constitutionality. Suspect class analysis finds its antecedents in Carolene Products's suggestion in footnote 4 that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" may be "a special condition" meriting heightened judicial scrutiny due to a breakdown in the political process. 1 50 By suggesting that political process breakdown provides the justification for heightened scrutiny, footnote 4 -and ultimately, its doctrinal expression in suspect class analysis and the tiered scrutiny structure -reveals its foundations as a methodology that allows courts to infer indirectly the existence of constitutional problems.' 51 By abandoning that approach in favor of a direct inquiry into whether a statute reflects government pursuit of private biases, Windsor, perhaps even more than Romer, signals a potentially decisive break with much of the Court's traditional equal protection jurisprudence.
"I Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (striking down section 3 of DOMA without deciding whether sexual orientation is a suspect class or even acknowledging that possibility beyond noting the executive branch's and the lower court's positions on the issue), with Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (acknowledging the argument that the mentally retarded or the mentally ill might constitute a suspect class, but declining to reach the merits of that argument because the plaintiffs had not presented it before the lower courts), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (recognizing an argument that a racial majority's decision to burden itself for the benefit of a minority might justify a lesser scrutiny standard for race-based affirmative action targeting the politically weaker group for benefits, but rejecting it as inapplicable in the immediate case).
148 Of course, this still might happen in the future in the context of sexual orientation. But the second reason Windsor is so significant, explained in the text immediately after this footnote, casts doubt on this possibility. 1 See id.; supra note 6 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Alito as suggesting this understanding of the suspect class/tiered scrutiny structure of equal protection law).
II. THE ENFORCEMENT POWER AND THE PERILS OF CONSTITUTIONAL POINTILLISM

A. The Coming Conflict
Windsor's potentially conclusive rejection of suspect class analysis raises serious questions about the future of Enforcement Clause doctrine. As Part I explains, 152 the post-Boerne Enforcement Clause doctrine has relied heavily on the suspect class status of the group benefitted by the challenged legislation. While Coleman and Shelby County suggest some erosion of that approach, the approach is sufficiently ingrained that the disconnect between it and the Court's general abandonment of suspect class analysis culminating in Windsor, presents cause for concem. 153 This disconnect will have serious consequences as Congress continues to respond to the equality claims of non-suspect classes. The remarkable shift in public and congressional perceptions about same-sex marriage has quite possibly changed the political dynamic for the ENDA, making its enactment more likely. The ENDA's backers may even succeed in including employment protection for transgendered workers, a step that in the past has proved fatal to the bill's prospects. In ways not possible before the recent shift of opinion on marriage rights, it is also possible to envisage other sexual orientation equality legislation, such as public accommodations protection and even potentially federal protections against discriminatory state parentage and adoption laws. Moreover, equality legislation benefitting other emerging groups already exists. The GINA, which restricts discrimination based on one's genetic makeup, is already law. 154 Other groups, such as the obese, are beginning to press their equality claims, and have already achieved some measure of success. 155 Sexual orientation, transgendered status, genetic makeup, obesity: these highly disparate classification tools share the characteristics that they either are or may soon be the subject of federal Enforcement Clause legislation, have never had their suspect class status determined by the Court, and likely never will. If, and when, enforcement power challenges to these statutes reach the Court, the Court will have to review its own recent equal protection jurisprudence in order to determine whether the challenged statutes satisfy the congruence and proportionality test. As it currently stands, that jurisprudence - [Vol. 94:367
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at least as it deals with groups whose suspect class status has not been determined -takes the form of a particularized, ad hoc investigation into the legislation's public purpose. The next Section considers the enforcement power implications of that style of equal protection scrutiny.
B. One Without the Other: The Enforcement Power in a World of Constitutional Pointillism
One way to think about the enforcement power is to envision two concentric circles. The outer circle represents the set of liability and remedy rules enacted in the enforcement statute. The inner circle depicts the seriousness of the constitutional problem that the statute targets. The size of the inner circle may vary according to the regard the Court gives Congress's ability, through its legislative work product, to expand that circle through conclusions that the constitutional problem targeted is either more serious than the Court had perceived or unusually resistant to remedial action. 15 6 The distance between those two circles determines the statute's congruence and proportionality. While crude, this visualization captures the basic insight that the congruence and proportionality standard, at base, requires some reasonable relationshipliterally, some congruence and proportionality -between the right protected and the means employed to protect it.
The viability of this approach, however, depends on the inner circle being susceptible to a coherent representation. There is much to applaud in calling something what it really is -in these cases, mean-spirited attempts to burden a group for reasons that amount to simple dislike -even if, by and large, a court should show some humility when accusing a legislature (especially the federal legislature) of acting out of such motives. 1 5 9 Indeed, the difficulty the Court had encountered in leveling such direct verdicts on legislative action is partly what led it to abandon its pre-1937 "class legislation" approach to constitutional rights, which sought to distinguish between valid legislation that pursued legitimate police power goals and invalid "class legislation" that impaired rights or discriminated against groups for no legitimate reason.' 60 The Court's abandonment of that approach led it to embrace in its place a methodology that focused on both textually precise rights, which make judicial review more legitimate, as well as on legislation that either directly impairs political participation or harms politically powerless minorities, which provides a warning signal that the legislation did not fairly account for all groups' interests. 1 61 But that latter, indirect approach to constitutional adjudication is exactly that -indirect. Windsor, by abjuring such indirect constitutional jurisprudence, cuts to the core of what equal protection requires.
Nevertheless, as normatively attractive as it may be, such direct constitutional analysis complicates the Court's Enforcement Clause case law. Decisions such as Windsor are particularized, focusing precisely and uniquely on the idiosyncrasies of the challenged statute. 162 To analogize this approach to art, such decisions are pointillist, rather than reflective of broad doctrinal American constitutional order is a government that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has reasons for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant that government's actions are undertaken in good faith and for reasons that are generally seen to be appropriate.").
"I Cf W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943) (suggesting that local authorities may be more prone than Congress to fail to respect constitutional rights).
160 For a full explanation of this concept and its application in constitutional law during the Lochner era, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITON BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) . 161 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (reserving heightened scrutiny for legislation that either appears to transgress one of the rights in the Bill of Rights or that appears to either restrict political participation rights or reflect prejudice against minorities that enjoy less access to the political process); see also S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (reserving heightened scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause for state statutes that disproportionately burden entities or interests not represented within the state's legislative process).
162 For example, the Court's analysis in Windsor relied heavily on section 3's history, and even the name of the statute. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-94 (2013) ("The history of DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute.").
[Vol. 94:367 brushstrokes. 163 By directly reviewing the challenged law for animus, such decisions cut to the core of what equal protection requires, rather than applying a broadly applicable level of heightened scrutiny. But such analysis remains, by definition, highly particularized. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in Windsor itself, a conclusion that a legislature has acted with animus when enacting a particular statute does not reflect a broader conclusion about the general inappropriateness of that type of classification. It says little even about the likelihood that other statutes classifying on that same ground and on that same topic are similarly motivated. 164 Of course, as a realistic matter, a finding of animus in a series of cases could lead a court to become more suspicious of a legislature's motivations whenever it classifies on that ground. But acting on that suspicion would, almost literally, amount to declaring the group suspect or quasi suspect. In the absence of such a declaration, a finding of animus in one case of sexual orientation discrimination would, at least formally, say little about the likely constitutionality of a different instance of discrimination against gays and lesbians.' 65 Indeed, in both Windsor and Romer, Justice Kennedy buttressed the particularity of his animus conclusions by relying heavily on what he described as the highly unusual breadth of both DOMA and Amendment 2, as well as what he described as DOMA's unusual deviation from the federal law practice of respecting state definitions of marriage.
The result is that it is difficult to apply the congruence and proportionality test to a statute protecting a group that may have won equal protection victories, but only on such particularistic grounds. Unless one is going to sub silentio treat that group as a suspect class on the theory that several instances of legislative animus suggest a constitutional rule generally disfavoring such discrimination, the most one can do when considering an enforcement statute protecting that group is to ask whether the particular type of discrimination targeted by the enforcement statute is likely grounded in animus. To illustrate this point, consider the ENDA. 166 Given Romer and Windsor, at this stage of doctrinal development, a court considering the ENDA as enforcement legislation would presumably have to ask whether employment discrimination against gays and lesbians 167 is, as a general matter, motivated by animus.1 68 163 See Courthion, supra note 36 (explaining that Pointillism is a "technique for portraying the play of light using tiny brushstrokes of contrasting colors").
'6 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority focuses on the legislative history and title of this particular Act; those statute specific considerations will, of course, be irrelevant in future cases about different statutes." (citation omitted)). 165 See, e.g., id. 166 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013) . 167 To simplify the analysis, this example leaves out consideration of the ENDA's transgender protections.
168 Of course, it is possible that such discrimination is merely "innocently irrational" -that is, lacking in any rational connection to a legitimate government interest, but That constitutional harm -government action motivated by animus -is the only content of the "inner circle" against which the ENDA could be tested for congruence and proportionality, 169 given the lack of any judicial doctrine identifying sexual orientation as a generally suspect classification tool.
Such an inquiry might be conceptually difficult. As stated previously, it would require, as a condition of upholding the ENDA, a conclusion that sexual orientation employment discrimination is, as a general matter, based on animus. Such a conclusion would amount to a step beyond the conclusions in Romer and Windsor that the particular statutes in question were motivated by animus. 1 7 0 Moreover, the more generalized animus conclusion the Court would have to reach in order to uphold the ENDA seems, as a logical matter, more difficult for the Court to defend in light of Garrett's insistence on a strong evidentiary record supporting enforcement legislation benefitting a non-suspect class. 171 Recall that Garrett insisted that such legislation be supported by a record of discrimination that, if litigated, would have been struck down as failing the rational basis test.'
72 Applied to the ENDA, this requirement would nevertheless "innocent" of any subjective bad intent. Such "innocent irrationality" is a conceptually troublesome concept, in light of its implied conclusion of utter government incompetence. It would be especially troublesome if this idea were transplanted from the context of direct equal protection review, where it is at least possible to conceptualize a particular government action as innocent of animus but nevertheless utterly irrational, see, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989) (finding a state tax assessor's decision unconstitutionally irrational without hinting that it was motivated by animus), to the very different context of enforcement legislation review, where it would entail a court concluding that an entire species of government action (here, sexual orientation employment discrimination) was similarly innocent but nevertheless utterly irrational. If an entire type of government conduct, for example, sexual orientation employment discrimination, is to be condemned as failing the rational basis test, it must be because of a conclusion about animus, rather than "pure" irrationality. 169 See supra Part II.B (describing the "inner and outer circle" approach to applying the congruence and proportionality analysis as well as discussing the difficulty of applying this approach given Windsor). 170 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding DOMA unconstitutional given its violation of the basic equal protection principle that no law be "motivated by an improper animus"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("[Amendment 2] seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects .... "). 171 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001) (finding that the ADA's legislative record "fail[ed] to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled").
172 Id. at 368 (finding the ADA's legislative record failed to establish a pattern of state discrimination that would be held unconstitutional under rational basis review). Of course, Amendment 2 and DOMA would stand as examples of sexual orientation discrimination struck down as animus-motivated legislation. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. But whether those state actions, related to topics other than employment discrimination, would satisfy a conscientious application of the Garrett standard, remains an open question, even if one adds to that list the scattering of lower court cases striking down [Vol. 94:367 require the compilation of a record of sexual orientation employment discrimination that not only lacked any rational basis, but also was mean spirited. Of course, the Court could simply assert that any such discrimination exhibits animus. But such a holding would, yet again, go a long way toward declaring sexual orientation a suspect class. It would not go all the way: At least ostensibly, the holding would be limited to employment, leaving it possible, for example, for states to continue engaging in sexual orientation discrimination in other areas of life, such as parenting and marriage. Nevertheless, that holding would both reflect a step beyond Romer and Windsor and push hard against the Court's refusal to identify sexual orientation as a generally suspect class.
III. A WAY FORWARD
A. The Problem, Summarized
Part II describes a paradoxical legal landscape. First, the record reveals two equal protection victories for gay rights advocates where the Court found the sexual orientation discrimination to be motivated by animus. 173 Those cases are notable for their failure even to acknowledge the possibility of an inquiry into the suspect classification status of sexual orientation. Windsor, the more recent of these cases, suggests an abandonment of traditional equal protection "fit" review, 7 4 in favor of a direct but ad hoc inquiry into whether a government action fails equal protection's fundamental requirement of public purpose motivation.
175 Second, and in tension with this first development, enforcement power doctrine as it currently stands still relies heavily on generalized suspect class determinations. Coleman may point to a different direction on this issue, sexual orientation discrimination as based on unconstitutional animus. See Araiza, New Groups, supra note 34, at 472 n.122 (citing Circuit Court decisions striking down states discrimination against gay individuals). 171 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (inquiring into "whether a law is motivated by an improper animus or purpose" to ensure that it does not run afoul of the Constitution's minimum guarantee "'that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group" (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973))).
but for now the different analysis in it and Shelby County remains too tentative to be confident that the Court has embraced a new approach.
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As Part II explains, these two components of the Court's current enforcement power inquiry combine to create a situation where the Court has recognized the constitutional flaws in a particular type of discrimination, but has done so utilizing an approach that undermines Congress's power to legislate against that same problem. This irony is compounded when one realizes that the Court's gay rights equal protection decisions -especially Windsor -reflect an aggressive probing of legislative action. 177 Thus, the paradox: The very aggressiveness of the Court's approach to the underlying equal protection question appears to exclude congressional participation in the same antidiscrimination project.
The possible enactment of ENDA and other gay rights-protective enforcement legislation will pressure the Court to resolve this paradox. The Court has no real alternative to finding a new path, unless it is content with either ignoring its own Enforcement Clause jurisprudence or, bizarrely, preventing Congress from participating in the same sexual orientation equality project on which the Court itself has embarked. Nor is this a problem limited to ENDA, or to sexual orientation discrimination more generally. Instead, it extends to all forms of discrimination that have not yet been denominated constitutionally suspect and either have attracted or will attract congressional attention. This Part concludes the Article by laying out a template for harmonizing the Court's new approach to equal protection with Enforcement Clause doctrine. In essence, it considers how the Court can incorporate Windsor's pointillist equal protection analysis into the congruence and proportionality test.
B. The Way Forward
The key to resolving this issue lies, first, in understanding the difference between constitutional doctrine and constitutional law, and second, in according appropriate respect to legislation enforcing the latter. As scholars [Vol. 94:367 and judges 179 have recognized, the Court's suspect class doctrine reflects constitutional doctrine -that is, a set of judicially manageable rules that seek to apply underlying constitutional law, even if they are not themselves such law. By contrast, the Court's approach in cases such as Windsor reflects a much more direct, unmediated application of equal protection's core requirement that the government not classify in pursuit of a purely private interest, such as simple dislike of a group. This rule has not only driven many of the Court's rational basis plus equal protection cases, 180 but has been recognized as a foundational constitutional requirement transcending a particular clause. 18 Windsor directly engaged that rule. It examined DOMA, including the statute's legislative history and even its title, and concluded that it is "a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect [that is, persons in state-recognized same-sex marriages],' ' l 82 whose "interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages ... was more than an incidental effect"' 183 but rather "was its essence."' 184 It buttressed this conclusion by American constitutional tradition has long recognized a judicial authority, not necessarily linked to any specifically enumerated guarantee, to invalidate truly arbitrary legislation."); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the fundamental nature of the rule against government action in pursuit of purely private interests); Powell, supra note 158, at 275 ("The baseline of the American constitutional order is a government that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has reasons for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant that government's actions are undertaken in good faith and for reasons that are generally seen to be appropriate."). What does Windsor's approach mean for the constitutionality of gay rights enforcement legislation and, by extension, enforcement legislation benefitting other groups whose suspect class status remain undecided? The Court's enforcement power doctrine requires a court to examine the relationship between enforcement legislation and the underlying, court-identified, constitutional violation that the legislation targets. Windsor's approach to DOMA's constitutionality -its failure to give DOMA heightened review explicitly and its focus on the particularities of Congress's motivations -rather than standard "fit" review' 90 -makes it difficult to measure that relationship. The inevitable generality of any legislation means that a Congress considering federal enforcement legislation would almost certainly draft it in general terms.
91 But cases such as Windsor identify the targeted constitutional violation with pinpoint -or pointillist -particularity.
184 Id.
181 Id. at 2694 ("Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans' benefits.").
186 Id. at 2693 ("DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages.").
187 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) ("Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by [Amendment 2].").
188 Id. at 635 (considering whether the justifications for Amendment 2, offered by the state, lend legitimacy to the legislation).
189 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (exposing the majority's failure to consider the arguments put forth by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) party in defense of section 3). But see Young & Blondel, supra note 3, at 137-42 (suggesting that the majority at least implicitly considered some justifications for section 3). 190 See supra note 164 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts' statement in Windsor that the majority's analysis of section 3 means nothing for judicial review of other marriage or sexual orientation discrimination, given the majority's focus on the particular motivations driving Congress to enact section 3).
191 This would not have to be the case, if, for example, enforcement legislation was aimed at the action of a particular state, for example, a practice allowed by only one state in the nation. But even in such a case, the enforcement legislation would likely be worded in a generally applicable way, and its constitutionality would have to turn on whether the targeted state action was, as a general matter, likely unconstitutional. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3, 652-53 (1966) (acknowledging that section 4(e) of the Thus, the question: How can Windsor's pointillist approach to constitutional law map onto or translate into judicial review of enforcement legislation? Perhaps it cannot. Perhaps Windsor does not imply any additional congressional enforcement authority to combat states' sexual orientation discrimination. But, as Part II explains, that conclusion would lead to the odd, hardly credible, and logically unacceptable result that consistent judicial vindications of sexual orientation equal protection claims are irrelevant to the constitutionality of congressional attempts to enforce the same constitutional right. Another, more intuitive approach proposes that the decisions from Romer to Windsor (including Lawrence) reveal a systemic constitutional problem with sexual orientation discrimination, thus justifying more deferential review of enforcement legislation on that topic. This approach, however, amounts to a backdoor bestowal of suspect class status on sexual orientation. 92 While such a bestowal might be welcome for reasons of transparency and doctrinal coherence, the Court has conspicuously failed even to consider the suspect class question ever since Justice Brennan called on the Court to do so nearly thirty years ago.' 93 As explained previously, 194 Windsor provided the Court with a logical opportunity to do so. Indeed, it presented the unusual spectacle of both formal parties calling on the Court to address the suspect class question. 195 Nevertheless, the Court again demurred, confirming its long-standing disinterest in this approach. 96 Thus, this latter answer to the translation problem simply is not responsive to the Court's own conduct.
The translation question therefore requires another answer. Inevitably, it requires a court to translate Windsor's underlying approach into the institutional context of legislative action. In particular, it requires a court to consider how congressional deliberation on an enforcement statute might apply Voting Rights Act was targeted at the protection of Puerto Rican voters in New York City, but was nevertheless phrased more generally). Answering that question requires carefully examining the relative institutional legitimacy and capabilities of courts and Congress when examining state government action for animus. This examination suggests a promising line of thought: While courts may feel unable to reach broad conclusions about whether a particular species of discrimination is infused with animus, Congress may be better positioned to do just that.' 98 As the institution whose nationwide representativeness, numerosity, and regularly renewed electoral legitimacy render it most representative of the nation's evolving sense of fairness, Congress should be presumed to have special authority when it pronounces a particular species of discrimination to be so fundamentally unfair as to reflect nothing but simple dislike -that is, animus. 1 99 Again, difficult questions might arise when a court seeks to decide exactly how much deference to accord such congressional determinations. But for now, if the question is simply how analysis such as that in Windsor can map onto the distinct context of legislative action, it is appropriate to focus on the significant institutional differences between courts and Congress when each polices state action for compliance with equal protection principles. Those differences point to a special role for Congress in identifying actions motivated by animus. 198 See id at 935-38 (showing that courts are limited in the amount of factfinding that they may perform in order to judge whether an example of differential treatment is appropriate or not, and explaining why legislators are better suited for this factfinding mission that results in enforcement legislation).
199 See id. at 923-25, 936 (explaining Congress's unique capacity and authority to find facts relating to the enforcement of equal protection, and suggesting these characteristics of legislative action call for judicial deference to such findings). 200 See id. at 923-25 (describing the institutional difference& which lead the Author to conclude that legislators merit deference when reaching decisions concerning equal protection enforcement). Of course, it is possible for Congress to fail to use its capabilities to ferret out and correct instances of animus-motivated state government action. Indeed, if It is important for the Court to engage in the mapping process called for in this Article. Failing to do so would disable Congress from participating fully in the same process of constitutional construction with regard to sexual orientation equality that the Court has engaged in since Romer. More generally, it would disable Congress from responding to the equality claims of other groups whose direct equal protection claims will likely be decided on the same ad hoc and particularized grounds employed in Windsor. The approach this Article proposes would allow Congress a meaningful role in enforcing the rights the Court itself has identified as central to the principle of equal protection. In particular, it adapts the enforcement power to the Court's new equal protection jurisprudence reflected in Windsor. The next Section explains this approach.
C. Adapting the Enforcement Power to Pointillist Constitutional Jurisprudence
Two preliminary points bear repeating before elaborating on the approach suggested above. 201 First, the proposed approach addresses congressional power to enact enforcement legislation targeting a group's constitutional right to be free of animus-motivated state discrimination. 2 0 2 Second, the institutional . Nevertheless, the qualities discussed in the text still give Congress special capabilities in uncovering and correcting state government animus, and militate in favor of a strong enforcement power when it does so. Still, there remains the possibility that enforcement legislation may in fact perversely reflect or instantiate animus rather than correct it. In earlier work, the Author has discussed this possibility and offered an approach to prevent it. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 34, at 909-10, 935-36, 950-51 (explaining how enforcement legislation that conflicts with the Court's statement of core constitutional rules should be struck down as exceeding Congress's enforcement power). 201 See supra Part III.B (introducing the approach the current Section explains more fully). 202 Thus, this approach would not apply to enforcement legislation that sought to apply other constitutional rules the Court has found in the Equal Protection Clause. For example, it appears as though the Court has adopted an approach to race that finds in the Fourteenth Amendment a strong presumptive commitment to color blindness. See, e.g., supra note 106 (citing a prominent scholar's conclusion on this point and a recent Supreme Court case reaffirming it). This commitment is controversial among both scholars and judges. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's review of race classifications should distinguish between classifications that seek to include and those that seek to oppress); Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1986) (arguing that antisubordination should be understood as the Equal Protection Clause's motivating principle). Nevertheless, it appears to reflect the current Court's difference between Congress and courts most relevant to this congressional power is that Congress's nationwide representativeness, numerosity, and constantly renewed electoral mandate render it better positioned to discern and, crucially, to instantiate into generally applicable rules the values held by U.S. citizens -in particular, estimations of the fundamental fairness (or lack thereof) inherent in certain types of discrimination.
These observations combine to support broad congressional power to enact enforcement legislation that reflects U.S. citizens' basic value judgments about the fairness of particular types of discrimination. Consider the inquiry the Court performed in Windsor: The Court examined the details of the statute in order to determine whether its "principal purpose and ... necessary effect" was to "demean" a particular group of persons. 20 3 When translated into the context of Congress's particular institutional characteristics -in particular, its superior ability to legislate generally and to perceive and act on American values -Windsor's approach suggests significant congressional competence and legitimacy to enact enforcement legislation premised on such conclusions. 2 0 4 Put simply, if Windsor reflects a judicial method that looks directly for animus where courts can find it -in unique statutes, enacted at unique times and under unique circumstances -then the congressional power to police against such constitutional violations should allow enforcement legislation based on analogous but broader concerns about animus and fundamental fairness.
The enforcement power latitude justified by Congress's institutional characteristics does not mean an unreviewable enforcement power. An unreviewable enforcement power would contradict Boerne's insistence that a line exists between constitutional interpretation and constitutional enforcement, with congressional power extending only to the latter. 2 Still, the enforcement power theory sketched above raises serious questions about whether it constitutes a de facto return to Katzenbach and its acceptance of congressional power to enact into law Congress's own interpretation of the Constitution. But, properly understood, this power is subject to significant judicial review. First, and most notably, the Court retains the power to determine the scope of the equal protection guarantee. Our modem understanding of equal protection as an across-the-board guarantee of equality for all persons with regard to all government actions arose only because successive Courts interpreted it that way. They need not have. The Court could have limited the guarantee to blacks, 2 10 or to racial equality more generally, 211 or even just to groups rather than individuals. 212 It could also have limited the equality guarantee to only the exercise of particular rights, most notably, the rights enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.213 Indeed, it could also have interpreted that guarantee simply as mandating equality in the protection of rights -as, literally, a guarantee of the "equal protection of the laws" rather 207 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) ("[I]t is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."); id at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority's approach); id. at 651 n. 10 (majority opinion responding to Justice Harlan's critique). 208 See supra note 47 (highlighting the broad agreement on the Court concerning the adoption of the congruence and proportionality standard). 209 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
210 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) ("We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision."). 211 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879) (describing the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause together as "declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States"). 212 Cf Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (finding uncontroversial the proposition that a plaintiff can state a valid equal protection claim as a "class of one"). 213 See, e.g., RAouL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY 169-92 (1977) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment simply aimed at constitutionalizing the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
than "the protection of equal laws. ' 214 The Court did none of this. As a matter of core constitutional interpretation, a function Boerne reserves to the judiciary, the Court has, instead, understood the clause as a generally applicable guarantee that all government classifications be at least minimally related to a legitimate government interest.
15
Second, even congressional applications of this fundamental constitutional rule of minimal relationship to a legitimate, public-regarding purpose remain subject to judicial review. Judicial scrutiny, however, would focus on whether Congress had used its particular institutional capabilities appropriately to perform the type of analysis the Court itself appears to be performing as part of its new style of equal protection review. In particular, judicial review would examine whether enforcement legislation accurately reflected the current moral views of the American people about the fundamental fairness of the type of discrimination at issue. 216 Thus, courts would consider, for example, whether the type of discrimination targeted by an enforcement statute had been rejected by other government entities and civil society groups, as well as by the public. This review would seek to ensure that enactment of the challenged legislation reflected a societal consensus rejecting that discrimination, rather than an idiosyncratic congressional victory for a group that had not successfully made its equality argument to American society.
Such review would undoubtedly be difficult. Questions would arise about which groups' opinions should matter the most, and how much of a consensus would be necessary in order to uphold an enforcement statute. underlying equal protection questions has changed. That change -away from heavy reliance on suspect class analysis and toward more precisely targeted examination of a statute's compliance with equal protection's core public purpose requirement -has undermined its current approach to Enforcement Clause cases, which relies heavily on that now seemingly abandoned suspect class methodology. Windsor makes this abandonment all the more emphatic. As such, it only increases pressure on the Court to alter its Enforcement Clause jurisprudence accordingly.
D. Application
The ENDA 21 8 presents a timely example of how this approach would play out.
2 19 A court considering the ENDA -for simplicity's sake considered here in its stripped-down form, without transgender protections -would have to inquire whether American society had evolved to the point that it considers sexual orientation-based employment discrimination fundamentally inconsistent with equal protection's promise that discrimination must be justified by something other than mere dislike of the burdened group. In reviewing whether Congress had appropriately reached that conclusion, a court would consider the policies and practices of employers across the United States. In contrast with the approach in Garrett, this inquiry would apply to not just state government employers, but also to private employers. 220 This broader inquiry is justified because the review proposed in this Article seeks to answer national consensus had developed that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual and thus violates the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of An important difference between the Supreme Court's use of this method in the Eighth Amendment area and this Article's proposal is that this Article gives the "counting" decision in the first instance to Congress, through its perception of a national consensus as filtered through the national democratic process. While judicial review of enforcement legislation would review that perception, it would not do so as the Court does in the Eighth Amendment area -that is, in the first instance, as an unelected Court rejecting policies of states perceived to constitute a minority. Rather, judicial review in our context would check the use by the nationally accountable federal legislature of its explicit power to police states by enacting enforcement legislation.
218 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013) . 219 In November 2013, the Senate passed the ENDA by a bipartisan vote of sixty-four to thirty-two. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http:// www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/employment-non-discrimination-act (last visited Nov. 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M3P7-6KFL. a fundamentally different question than did the review in Garrett. The relevant question would not be, as Garrett asked, whether states were engaging in conduct that a court applying the decisional rule of rational basis scrutiny would hold unconstitutional. 221 Rather, the proper question would be whether American society had condemned a particular practice -here, sexual orientation-based employment discrimination -as violating the constitutional rule against animus.
A court reviewing the ENDA would also examine other evidence. Did major civil society groups condemn sexual orientation-based exclusion from other basic arenas of social life? For example, the prevalence of sexual orientation protection in states' and municipalities' public accommodation ordinances, while not directly probative of a national consensus on employment discrimination, is relevant to public opinion about whether sexual orientation is a relevant discriminatory criterion with regard to inclusion in social life more generally. For this reason, other, more general nondiscrimination provisionsfor example, those governing membership in unions, schools, and professional organizations -would also be relevant, if only indirectly, to ENDA's constitutionality. For a similar reason, statements by major social groups about the acceptability of such discrimination -for example, statements by affinity groups and political parties -would also matter, even if those groups did not engage in the workplace activities the ENDA would regulate.
This approach should not elicit the objection that, by soliciting opinion from a wide variety of social groups, it stacks the deck in favor of elite opinion. 222 First, such groups come in all shapes and ideologies, from corporations to universities to ethnic and social affinity groups. If performed appropriately, judicial review of such opinions should not systematically skew one way or the other. Second, and more importantly, it bears recalling that such review would become necessary only if Congress in fact enacted a piece of enforcement legislation. Thus, nonelite opinion would already have validated the fairness judgment instantiated in that legislation, to the extent such opinion is accurately reflected in antidiscrimination legislation that successfully runs the federal lawmaking gauntlet. 222 Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court, by finding a Colorado antigay law to be based on animus, had adopted the views of elite opinion in condemning the views of the people of Colorado).
223 Of course, one can always question the extent to which congressional action reflects constituents' values, as opposed to the preferences of narrower interest groups or even legislators' own preference maximizations. See, e.g., Philip P. One benefit of this methodology is that it contains within it a built-in limiting mechanism. If national consensus -however defined, and with the admitted difficulty in discerning it -becomes the relevant test for enforcement legislation, then one might expect enforcement legislation to be upheld when it reflects views society is already putting into practice. State governments are part of that society; indeed, for many defenders of judicially protected federalism, states are worth protecting exactly because states are thought to be more responsive to local opinion. 224 If judicial review of enforcement legislation asks, fundamentally, whether American society has condemned the type of discrimination the statute attacks, then such review likely will validate legislation to the extent that state and local governments have already taken the lead.
Obviously, the enforcement power implicates serious federalism issues, in addition to issues about the proper allocation of power between Congress and the courts. The approach sketched out here truly respects federalism by focusing enforcement power review, in part, on how states among other entities have applied the Court's understanding of the underlying right -here, the right to be free of animus-motivated discrimination. In a very real way, it reflects a positive, cooperative federalism, by allowing states a role in determining how constitutional obligations are imposed on them. That role necessarily must be indirect and limited: ultimately, it is for the Court to determine the meaning of those obligations and for both the Court and Congress to enforce them. But an approach to judicial review of enforcement legislation that seeks to translate the vague, Court-identified antianimus rule on some issues has led to changes in legislators' positions that can be countered with other stories of congressional action that seems to fly in the face of public opinion. For example, the pollster and statistician Nate Silver has suggested that national public opinion on samesex marriage caused some portion of the large shift in favor of same-sex marriage by many States, as part of that society -indeed, as entities thought to be closer to local opinion than distant federal representatives 225 -can play a useful role when the Court reviews Congress's translation work. Such an approach is surely superior to the antagonistic federalism that marks the Court's current approach to enforcement power cases. To see this, one need only contrast the result under this approach with the one promoted by the dissenters in Hibbs, who attacked the enforcement power basis for the FMLA's family-care provisions exactly because states had already provided for family medical leave. 226 This latter approach exacerbates the mistake of the Court's juricentric approach to the enforcement power reflected in the Kimel-Garrett-Hibbs line of cases, 227 by focusing on the extent to which states have or have not violated the constitutional command, rather than on how states, as part of and reflective of American society, understand that command. Put simply, preventing Congress from acting on a national consensus condemning a particular type of discrimination because states have already acted on that consensus is to turn federalism from a cooperative enterprise into an unnecessarily antagonistic one.
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF POINTILLIST CONSTITUTIONALISM
Art historians tell us that pointillism is aimed at reproducing an accurate depiction of reality through the application of tiny dots of pure color. When filtered through human perception, those dots allow viewers to perceive the nuanced picture of light and shadow and color variations that exist in the world. 228 But without an infinite number of surrounding dots, any given pointillist dot fails to reveal that true reality. 229 Windsor is a pointillist opinion: By finding a core constitutional violation in the details of a particular statute, it marks a tiny dot of pure constitutional color. Indeed, just as a pointillist painting reminds viewers of the basic building blocks of our visual perception, 230 Windsor's precise focus on equal protection's core antianimus 225 See supra note 224. Legislation, however, is by definition a work characterized by broad brushstrokes of mixed pigments. A doctrinal mandate that enforcement legislation be congruent and proportional to the underlying constitutional violation creates tension when, as with sexual orientation (and likely other classifications), the Court depicts that violation with a pointillist's brush. Thus, the challenge for Enforcement Clause doctrine is to recognize that Congress and the Court sometimes paint in different styles. Each style may be appropriate to the institution that employs it, and each style may faithfully reflect constitutional reality. But each is nevertheless distinct.
It may well be appropriate for the Court to require that enforcement legislation have some relation to court-stated law; at least this Article assumes the existence of that requirement. But if Windsor does ultimately herald a new style of equal protection analysis, even for only a discrete category of challenges, the Court will have to develop a method for translating broad congressional enforcement brushstrokes into its own evolving interest in a very different style of constitutional art.
